Changes in the wealth of nations by Stephen L. Parente & Edward C. Prescott




the Wealth of Nations (p. 3) 
Stephen L. Parente 
Edward C. Prescott 
Early Progress on 
the "Problem of Economic 
Development" (p. 17) 
James A. Schmitz, Jr. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review 
ISSN 0271-5287 
Vol. 17, No. 2 
This publication primarily presents economic research aimed 
at improving policymaking by the Federal Reserve System and 
other governmental authorities. 
Any views expressed herein are those of the authors and 
not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
or the Federal Reserve System. 
Editor: Arthur J. Rolnick 
Associate Editors: S. Rao Aiyagari, John H. Boyd, Warren E. Weber 
Economic Advisory Board: R. Anton Braun, John Geweke, Edward J. Green, 
Ellen R. McGrattan, James A. Schmitz, Jr. 
Managing Editor: Kathleen S. Rolfe 
Article Editor/Writers: Kathleen S. Rolfe, Martha L. Starr 
Designer: Phil Swenson 
Associate Designer: Beth Leigh Grorud 
Typesetters: Jody Fahland, Correan M. Hanover 
Editorial Assistant: Diane M. Sanborn 
Circulation Assistant: Cheryl Vukelich 
The Quarterly Review is published by the Research Department 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Subscriptions are 
available free of charge. 
Articles may be reprinted if the reprint fully credits the source— 
the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank as well as the Quarterly 
Review. Please include with the reprinted article some version of 
the standard Federal Reserve disclaimer and send the Minneapo-
lis Fed Research Department a copy of the reprint. 
Direct all comments and questions to 
Quarterly Review 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
P.O. Box 291 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480-0291 
(612-340-2341 / FAX 612-340-2366). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review Spring 1993 
Changes in the Wealth of Nations 
Stephen L. Parente* Edward C. Prescott* 
Assistant Professor of Economics Adviser 
Northeastern University Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
and Professor of Economics 
University of Minnesota 
In his book The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) 
challenges the mercantile view that a nation becomes 
wealthier as its stocks of gold and silver increase. He ar-
gues that the wealth of a nation is not measured by its 
supply of precious metals, but by the productivity of its la-
bor force. An increase in the amount of gold bullion in a 
country may make its currency worth more than another 
country's, but the gold increase will not increase the rela-
tive worker productivity in the two countries. Accepting 
Smith's definition of a nation's wealth leads naturally to 
per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) as the appropri-
ate measure of that wealth. 
In this article, we use per-capita GDP data to deter-
mine what we call the economic development facts. We 
systematically examine the nature of the distribution of 
wealth across nations and describe how this distribution 
has evolved over specific historical periods. We also de-
scribe the wealth mobility of nations, that is, the changes 
in the relative wealth of individual nations. 
Such a systematic report is important for two reasons. 
First, data serve as a test of theory. Any theory inconsis-
tent with the development facts cannot help us understand 
the differences in the wealth of nations—or evaluate eco-
nomic policies that might help reduce those differences. 
(For a description of the successes and failures of existing 
theories, see the article by James A. Schmitz, Jr., in this 
issue.) Second, data can play an important role in the crea-
tion and evolution of successful theory. If we know what 
the development facts are, we should have a better idea 
what features belong and don't belong in a model of eco-
nomic development. 
We emphasize that this study is factual rather than em-
pirical. We have no underlying probability models here, 
and we draw no inferences to larger populations. We simp-
ly report what happened over the time periods for which 
we have been able to find useful data. Our approach is thus 
in the tradition of Simon Kuznets (1966). His reporting of 
the growth facts was important in Robert M. Solow's 
(1970) development of the neoclassical growth theory. 
This theory was a major advance in economics. It has 
proven useful not only in accounting for the growth facts, 
but also in accounting for business cycle fluctuations and 
determining the welfare consequences of economic poli-
cies. We hope that our study will stimulate the creation of 
theories that will prove as useful in analyzing the area of 
economic development. 
Our study reveals that the most prominent features of 
the data over the time periods examined—primarily, 1960-
85—are wealth disparity and wealth mobility. These fea-
tures can be summarized as four development facts: 
• In every year studied, there is great wealth disparity 
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3 among countries. In 1985, for example, the highest-
output countries were 29 times richer than the lowest-
output countries. 
• Wealth disparity has not increased or decreased. The 
distance between the richest and poorest countries re-
mained essentially the same throughout the 1960-85 
period. 
• The wealth distribution has shifted up: the richer got 
richer, but the poor did too. Therefore, no absolute 
poverty trap exists. 
• There have been development miracles and disasters. 
During the 1960-85 period, 10 countries increased 
their wealth relative to the wealth leaders by a factor 
of 2 or more. These miracles were matched by an 
equal number of development disasters: during the 
same period, the relative wealth of another 10 coun-
tries decreased by a factor of about 2. 
These are the facts that a theory of development must be 
consistent with if it is to be taken seriously. 
Methodology 
Sources of Data 
In the past, analyses of the evolution of the wealth distri-
bution and wealth mobility have been restricted to a set of 
currently rich countries because these were the only coun-
tries for which per-capita output data were available over 
a sufficiently long period of time. Today sufficiently long 
data series are available for most countries of the world. 
We use one main data set, supplemented with data from 
three other sources. 
• The Main Data Source 
Our primary data set is that of Robert Summers and Alan 
Heston (1991). They have compiled observations for 138 
countries for the nearly 40 years between 1950 and 1988. 
Unfortunately, however, observations for all 138 coun-
tries in the Summers and Heston data set are not available 
for all years. Because we want to consider the largest pop-
ulation of countries over the longest period of time, we 
use their data for just the 26 years between 1960 and 1985. 
As long as observations for a country are available for all 
years in the 1960-85 period and as long as that country 
had a population in 1969 of at least 1 million, that country 
is included in our analysis. We exclude countries with pop-
ulations smaller than 1 million because the wealth of such 
countries is too easily affected by external factors. Missing 
data and small populations are the only reasons we exclude 
countries.
1 
In 1969,120 countries in the world had a population of 
at least 1 million. Of these 120 countries, complete data are 
not available for 18. Eliminating these countries reduces 
our data set to a total of 102 countries for the 1960-85 
period. 
• Other Data Sources 
Obviously, we would like to have data that extend over 
longer time periods. The problem is that the further back 
we go, the set of countries for which data are available 
shrinks. The number of countries for which we have been 
able to find observations dating back at least to the begin-
ning of the 20th century is 29. When possible, we will 
also consider this 29-country data set here. 
This longer data set comes from three different sources. 
Observations for 16 of the 29 countries are those of Angus 
Maddison (1991). These 16 countries are all advanced in-
dustrialized countries, and observations on them begin in 
the year 1820. We supplement Maddison's data with data 
from the work of J. Bradford De Long (1988) and Pierre 
Van der Eng (1992). The De Long data begin in 1870 for 
Maddison's 16 plus 6 other countries. These others were, 
according to De Long, very similar to the Maddison 16 in 
their 1870 potential for development. The Van der Eng da-
ta begin in 1900 and include data for Japan and for 7 other 
Asian countries not included in either the Maddison or the 
De Long data. A problem with combining data from these 
three sources is that while the periods they cover overlap, 
the specific years for which they actually have data differ. 
For a list of all the countries and years included in our 
study, grouped by the source of their data, see the Appen-
dix. 
Types of Comparisons 
We compare the wealth of nations in two different ways: 
across different countries at one point in time and across 
different points in time for individual countries.* 
• At a Point in Time 
To compare wealth across nations at a point in time, com-
parable measures of per-capita GDP must be constructed. 
All our data sources construct such measures using a com-
mon set of prices. Summers and Heston, De Long, and 
Van der Eng use a common set of prices made up of the 
weighted averages across countries of the relative prices 
1 Summers and Heston rate the quality of data for each country, in their survey. We 
do not exclude countries based on these quality ratings because we think even the 
poorest-rated data in the survey contain valuable information. 
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of each good in a particular basket of final goods and ser-
vices. Here we refer to this set of prices as world prices. 
Maddison uses the relative prices of final goods and ser-
vices in the United States in 1985. 
Another approach to measuring output for international 
comparisons has often been used, but is not as good. This 
is to value each nation's basket of the quantities of final 
goods and services at domestic prices and then convert 
that measure of output into a common monetary unit by 
multiplying it by the exchange rate. The problem with this 
exchange rate method is that the amount that one currency 
can buy when exchanged for another currency is not the 
same across countries or across time. A U.S. dollar, for 
example, buys much more in India than in Japan. Similar-
ly, in 1985 a U.S. dollar bought less in western Europe 
than in the United States, but in 1965 the reverse was true. 
Such differences in exchange rates do not reflect differ-
ences in productivity. 
The distortions that result from this exchange rate meth-
od are not insignificant. When international prices are used 
instead of exchange rates to compute wealth in 1988, for 
example, Japan goes from being 10 percent wealthier than 
the United States to being only 70 percent as wealthy as 
the United States, and India's output goes from 2 percent 
to 5 percent of U.S. output. This factor difference of 20 
between the United States and India probably still over-
states the true difference in standards of living between 
the two countries, since the informal economy is probably 
a much larger fraction of total output in India than in the 
United States. The market basket of goods is also very dif-
ferent in a poor country like India than in a rich one like 
the United States. Still, the factor difference of 20 is a 
much more accurate indication of the difference in stan-
dards of living than the factor difference of 50 implied by 
the use of exchange rates. 
Because our per-capita GDP figures are based on world 
prices, our comparisons of wealth better measure differ-
ences in standards of living than previous comparisons 
based on exchange rates. 
When making comparisons of relative wealth across 
countries at a point in time, we measure GDP slightly dif-
ferently for our two data sets. For our 102-country data 
set, we divide each country's year t per-capita GDP mea-
sured in year t world prices by U.S. year t per-capita GDP 
measured in year t world prices. For our 29-country data 
set, we divide each country's year t per-capita GDP mea-
sured in base-year world prices by U.S. year t per-capita 
GDP measured in base-year world prices. We refer to both 
of these measures as a country's year t relative wealth. 
We would have preferred to use the year t measures of 
relative wealth that used year t world prices for both of 
these data sets. But we had to use measures constructed 
with base-year world prices for the 29-country data set be-
cause neither Maddison nor De Long nor Van der Eng 
provide observations of year t per-capita GDP in year t 
world prices. Unfortunately, this may mean our measures 
of relative wealth will miss some changes. One country's 
wealth may increase or decrease relative to another coun-
try's wealth if the baskets of the relative quantities of final 
goods and services change or if the relative prices of final 
goods and services change. Changes in relative wealth 
brought about by a change in relative prices are relevant 
to a study of changes in the wealth of nations. The mea-
sures of relative wealth for our 29-country data set will 
not reflect any such changes. 
• Across Points in Time 
While the use of year t prices in valuing year t quantities 
of final goods and services is a sensible procedure when 
comparing different countries' wealth at one point in time, 
it is not so reasonable when comparing one country's 
wealth at different points in time. The problem is that such 
measures of wealth may show changes over time even 
when the basket of the quantities of final goods and ser-
vices produced has not changed. This would happen if, for 
example, the quantities produced did not change between 
two years, but the prices of all goods doubled: for those 
two years, the measures of wealth that use each year's 
prices would show a doubling. 
Comparisons of a country's wealth at different points 
in time are thus typically based on measures of output that 
value the quantities of final goods and services produced 
in each year using prices for some base year. Such mea-
sures are commonly referred to as a nation's real output. 
By valuing the baskets of the quantities of final goods and 
services in different years with the same set of prices, the 
effect of a general increase in prices between periods on 
the measures of a nation's output in those periods is elimi-
nated. 
Maddison, De Long, and Van der Eng all use this base-
year pricing procedure in making comparisons of wealth 
across time. We considered following them here, but then 
chose an alternative procedure for our 102-country data set. 
Our alternative procedure not only eliminates the effect of 
a general increase in prices, but also is consistent with our 
measures of relative wealth. 
5 What we do is use a factor to transform each country's 
relative wealth each year into its 1985 value. We multiply 
the country's relative GDP in year t measured in year t 
world prices pt by this factor: 
(1) ft = (£>1985 ' XU.S.,t)/(Pm5 ' %S.,1985) 
where *USr is the vector of the quantities of final goods 
and services produced in the United States in year t. In 
words, ft is the value of U.S. per-capita GDP in year t, 
measured in 1985 world prices, divided by the value of 
U.S. per-capita GDP in 1985, measured in 1985 world 
prices. In our procedure, the United States acts as a link 
between two points in time, thus allowing the comparison 
of a country's wealth at those two points. We refer to these 
transformed measures simply as real wealth or real per-
capita GDP. 
For our 29-country data set, however, we essentially 
follow Maddison, De Long, and Van der Eng and use 
each country's year t per-capita GDP in base-year prices.
2 
For this data set, we cannot follow our alternative proce-
dure because observations for per-capita output measured 
in current-year prices are not provided by Maddison, De 
Long, and Van der Eng. Still, we also call these measures 
real wealth or real per-capita GDP. 
We could have picked a country other than the United 
States as the basis for measuring relative wealth and mak-
ing this connection across two points in time. We chose 
the United States because its data are reliable; it has been 
the leading industrialized economy, as measured by output 
per capita, since 1890; and it produces a diverse basket of 
goods. That diversity is important because the effect of a 
change in relative prices on U.S. wealth would likely be 
small compared to the effect of such a change on the 
wealth of a country specializing in only a handful of goods. 
Log Scales 
In our charts displaying the results of our analysis, we use 
logarithm scales because our interest is in the relative 
wealth of nations at a point in time and across time. Specif-
ically, most of our charts use log scales to the base 2. (On 
this scale, the number 0 corresponds to 2"°, or 1 in rela-
tive levels; the number -1 corresponds to 2 , or 1/2 in 
relative levels; the number -2 corresponds to 2~
2, or 1/4 
in relative levels; and so on.) An advantage of using the 
log scale is that in the log space, the distance between two 
points is just the absolute difference in logs. Thus, the dis-
tance between 1 and 1/2 and the distance between 1/2 and 
1/4 are the same. This means that whenever the percent-
age growth rate between two points in time is constant, 
the path of the logarithm of per-capita GDP shows up as 
a straight line in that time interval. The steepness of the 
slope of the line is proportional to the growth rate between 
the two points. 
Disparity Facts 
Now that we have shown how we chose and augmented 
the data sets and have clarified the methods by which we 
examine and compare the data, we can turn our attention 
to our results: the development facts themselves. The first 
set of facts concerns the disparity shown by the distribu-
tion of the relative wealth of nations. 
A Big Wealth Disparity. . . 
The first development fact, and a prominent feature of 
Chart 1, is that in every year of the 1960-85 period the 
range of the distribution of wealth among nations is wide. 
That width indicates the tremendous disparity in per-capita 
GDP across nations. To attach a few numbers to this dis-
parity, we calculate the average factor difference between 
the top and bottom 5 percent of the population of coun-
tries in our 1960-85 data set. In 1985, this factor differ-
ence was 29. Not surprisingly, the richest country in the 
world that year was the United States; the poorest was 
Ethiopia. The factor difference in 1985 per-capita GDP 
between these two extremes was 43.3.
3 
How does this disparity of wealth across nations com-
pare with, say, the disparity of wealth across regions of a 
country? It is definitely much larger than the difference in 
per-capita output between states in the United States. In 
this country, the difference in per-capita output between 
the top and bottom 5 percent of states in 1985 was a fac-
tor of just 1.8.
4 In that year, the richest state was Connect-
icut, the poorest was Mississippi, and their factor differ-
ence was only 2.
5 Thus, the disparity in per-capita output 
2We do, however, normalize year t per-capita GDP in base-year world prices for 
each country to base-year U.S. per-capita GDP in base-year prices. 
3For making such comparisons, it is really better to use measures of relative 
wealth. But for 1985, our measures of relative wealth and real wealth are the same. 
4The data for the states are income per capita, not output per capita. They do not 
include observations for Hawaii and Alaska, but do include observations for the District 
of Columbia. The state data are from U.S. Department of Commerce 1989. 
5Actually, these numbers overstate the size of the difference in the per-capita in-
comes between the richest and poorest states. This is because the measures of states' 
GDPs use state-own or region-specific prices in valuing output instead of a common 
set of prices. Prices, especially housing and rental prices, are typically higher in richer 
states than in poorer states. The use of a common set of prices would thus translate into 
smaller wealth differences between the rich and poor states. 
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Chart 1 
Wide and Steady Wealth Disparity 
Average Per-Capita GDP Relative to U.S. Level 
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across U.S. states pales in comparison to the disparity in 
per-capita output across nations. 
What about differences in income across workers with-
in a country? The difference in per-capita output between 
the highest- and lowest-paid workers within the United 
States is closer to the difference in per-capita output be-
tween the richest and poorest countries of the world. In 
the United States, workers in the bottom 5 percent of the 
distribution tend to be minimum wage earners. The output 
of a worker earning the minimum wage is roughly one-
third of the average output. The median worker in the top 
5 percent of the distribution, in contrast, produces three or 
four times the average. For the nations of the world, the 
bottom 5 percent of the distribution has output roughly 
one-fifth of the average while the top 5 percent of the dis-
tribution has output roughly five times the average. Thus, 
the disparity in output between the most- and least-pro-
ductive workers within the United States is about as large 
as the disparity in per-capita output between the richest 
and poorest nations of the world. 
. . . That Has Been Quite Constant 
The second development fact is that this big wealth dis-
parity has been quite constant over time. Lately, the ques-
tion of whether dispersion of the logarithm of per-capita 
output has decreased within a set of countries over time 
has received a lot of academic attention. Such decreases 
in dispersion have come to be called convergence.
6 
• Two Measures of Dispersion 
One common measure of the dispersion in a distribution 
is the simple range of the distribution. Chart 1 shows that 
convergence as measured by the range of this distribution 
does not apply to the 102-country data set examined here. 
In fact, the range of the distribution has not changed much 
at all. 
Another common measure of dispersion is the standard 
deviation of a population. (This is sort of the average dis-
tance of the individuals in the population from the popula-
tion's mean.) Chart 2 reports how the standard deviation 
of the logarithm of per-capita output of our large set of 
countries has varied over the 1960-85 period. Clearly, the 
standard deviation has increased; there has been some di-
vergence in this period. In fact, over the full 26-year peri-
od, the standard deviation increased 18.5 percent. The in-
crease appears to be fairly uniform up to 1980. Then, be-
tween 1980 and 1985, the standard deviation decreased 
slightly. So while the range of the distribution has not 
changed much, there is clearly more dispersion in 1985 
than in 1960. 
Are these results the same with different groups of 
countries and over a longer time period? 
Let's look at the western European countries, which are 
a common group to study. For this group, the issue of con-
vergence is related to the period of time being considered. 
Chart 3 displays the standard deviation of the logarithm 
of relative wealth for the group of western European coun-
tries. The chart shows this measure for this group of coun-
tries calculated both from our 102-country data set cover-
ing the 1960-85 period and from our 29-country data set 
covering the 1870-1979 period.
7 
What we see in the chart is that over the post-World 
War II period, the standard deviation of the distribution of 
relative wealth decreased fairly steadily, from 0.55 in 1960 
6Convergence is also used another way in the literature. This second type of con-
vergence refers to on average faster development by poorer countries. Robert J. Barro 
and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1992) have labeled this type of convergence ^-convergence 
and the other type o-convergence. 
7 The western European countries we study here are all those listed in the Appendix 
as part of the Maddison and De Long data except, of course, Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. Also, because Greece and 
Turkey are not included in our 29-country data set, we drop them from the calculations 
of the standard deviations for the 1960-85 period. 
7 to 0.42 in 1985. But over the much longer time period, 
the standard deviation showed no clear tendency to either 
decrease or increase. Over this longer period, that is, per-
capita output in the western European nations has not tend-
ed to either converge or diverge. 
Chart 2-4 
The Standard Deviation Measure of Wealth Disparity 
Based on the Distribution of Relative Per-Capita GDP 
Chart 2 In All 102 Countries: Increasing? 
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Another group of countries that receives a lot of atten-
tion is the countries of southeastern Asia. According to 
our data, for these countries, the issue of convergence is 
not sensitive to the time period considered. In the postwar 
period and throughout the 20th century, there is no ten-
dency for wealth to converge. Rather, the clear tendency 
has been for the dispersion of wealth to increase over all 
periods. 
Chart 4 displays the standard deviation of the logarithm 
of per-capita GDP for the eight countries in the Van der 
Eng data set starting in 1900. This standard deviation in-
creased steadily, from 0.28 in 1900 to 0.58 in 1950 to 
1.26 in 1985. Now, the amount of dispersion among these 
eight countries might very well decrease dramatically in 
the next 50 years, but for the 1900-85 period, the disper-
sion has only increased dramatically. 
This increase can also be seen in Chart 5, which plots 
the time paths for the wealth of these southeastern Asian 
countries. In 1900, the maximum wealth difference was 
less than a factor of 2. In 1985, this difference was greater 
than a factor of 16. Japan's wealth relative to the wealth 
of India and Burma increased especially dramatically in 
the 20th century. 
Chart 3 In Western Europe: Decreasing? 
From the 102-Country Data Set From the 29-Country Data Set 
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Source of basic data: Summers and Heston 1991, Maddison 1991, 
De Long 1988, Van der Eng 1992 
Chart 5 
Dramatic Divergence in Southeastern Asia 
Per-Capita GDP Relative to 1985 U.S. Level 
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• The Distribution Itself 
Among all 102 countries, remember, the range of the dis-
tribution of relative per-capita GDP has been wide and 
more or less constant over the 1960-85 period, while dis-
persion within the distribution has increased somewhat. 
Chart 6 takes a look at the distribution itself. The chart 
shows how countries are distributed across the various in-
tervals of relative wealth in 1960 and in 1985. The hori-
zontal axis measures these intervals; the vertical axis mea-
sures the percentage of countries in each interval. (Again, 
the relative wealth intervals correspond to the log scale to 
the base 2.) 
Clearly, the distribution of wealth has changed between 
1960 and 1985: it has become much closer to a uniform 
distribution. In 1960, the distribution is essentially single-
peaked, but it's far from normal. This is quite different 
from the distribution of the logarithms of household in-
come within the United States, which is close to normal. 
Since 1960, some of the center mass of wealth has spread 
into the tails of the distribution, which is why in 1985 the 
distribution appears approximately uniform.
8 
Recall Chart 2, where we saw that the amount of dis-
persion in relative wealth as measured by the standard de-
viation increased over the 1960-85 period. We know that 
the standard deviation of a distribution which is uniformly 
distributed over an interval is always larger than the stan-
dard deviation of a single-peaked distribution over the in-
terval. This change from a single-peaked distribution to 
one approximately uniform accounts for the increase in 
standard deviation we saw in Chart 2. 
Mobility Facts 
Although the wide disparity between the richest and the 
poorest countries persisted throughout 1960-85, that 
doesn't mean countries did not experience significant 
changes in wealth. Quite the contrary: Our data reveal two 
facts about such changes during this period. The total dis-
tribution of per-capita GDP shifted up during 1960-85. 
And individual countries experienced some wealth mobil-
ity; that is, in this period, some countries experienced 
large increases or decreases in wealth relative to the rich-
est countries in the world. 
The Distribution 
Since a natural question when examining changes in the 
wealth of nations is whether the wealth of nations has been 
increasing over time, we first document the upward shift 
in the distribution of wealth. 
The wealth of the richest nations surely has been in-
Chart 6 
A Change in the Distribution of Wealth 
Per-Capita GDP Relative to U.S. Level in the 102-Country Data Set 
During 1960 Hand 1985 • 
% of 
Countries 
Fraction of U.S. 
Source of basic data: Summers and Heston 1991 
creasing. Chart 7 shows GDP per worker hour in the lead-
ing industrialized market economy over the 1580-1989 
period.
9 During these (roughly) 400 years, three different 
counties were the industrial leaders. The chart shows that 
each leader experienced increases in wealth while it was 
the leader, and each subsequent leader experienced larger 
increases than the previous one. The Netherlands, the 
wealthiest industrialized country during 1580-1820, expe-
rienced average annual growth of real GDP per worker 
hour of roughly 0.2 percent over this period. The United 
Kingdom, the leader during 1820-90, experienced average 
annual growth of 1.2 percent over this period, and the 
United States, the leader since 1890, experienced average 
annual growth of 2.2 percent during 1890-1989. 
Over the long data period, the poor and, more general-
8The 1985 distribution is approximately uniform—but not exactly so. Very few 
countries, for instance, have relative wealth within the range of [1/64,1/32]. That is true 
in 1960 as well. 
9This chart is from Maddison 1991 (p. 31). In this chart, we use GDP per worker 
hour instead of GDP per capita as the measure of a country's wealth because Maddison 
does not provide observations for GDP per capita going back to 1580. 
9 ly, the nonleader nations' relative wealth also increased. 
For the Maddison 16, real GDP per capita increased by an 
average factor of 15 between 1820 and 1989. This trans-
lates into average annual compounded growth of 1.5 per-
cent. For the 6 countries in the De Long data set that are 
not included in the Maddison 16, the average factor in-
crease over the 1870-1979 period was 5 and the average 
annual growth, 1.25 percent. For the 7 countries in the Van 
der Eng data set that are not included in the Maddison 16, 
the average factor increase in real GDP over the 1900-85 
period was 4 and the average annual growth, 1.6 percent. 
Are such increases characteristic of a larger set of coun-
tries as well? For our data set of 102 countries, real per-
capita GDP increased on average by a factor of 1.8 be-
tween 1960 and 1985. This translates into annual average 
growth in per-capita GDP of 1.9 percent. The increase is 
not limited to the high-, middle-, or low-income countries 
of the distribution, either. As is evident in Chart 8, the av-
erage of each of those three groups has been increasing 
over time. Both the median and the range of the distribu-
tion have clearly shifted upward. 
• A Slowdown 
However, while the range has shifted upward over time, 
Chart 8 also shows that the increases have not been uni-
form. Indeed, the latter years of the 1960-85 period saw 
a marked slowdown in the wealth increases for countries 
in the top, middle, and bottom of the distribution. A sys-
tematic examination of this slowdown requires that we 
consider all the countries in our data set, not just these 
three groups. For the set of 102 countries, the average fac-
tor increase in wealth over the first half of our time period 
(1960-73) was 1.46, which translates into an average an-
nual rate of change of 2.9 percent. In contrast, the average 
factor increase over the second half (1973-85) was 1.18, 
which translates into an average annual rate of change of 
1.4 percent. The 1973-85 slowdown is clearly not limited 
to a handful of countries. 
How does this period compare to development in peri-
ods before 1960? Was the slowdown part of a much long-
er trend, or was it just characteristic of the most recent pe-
riod? We cannot answer this question for the set of 102 
countries. Data are not available before 1960 for a signifi-
cant number of these countries; some did not even exist 
before 1960. We can, however, address the question with-
in the set of 16 Maddison countries.
1
0 
The Maddison 16 display a growth slowdown between 
the 1950-73 period and the 1973-89 period. Their aver-
age annual compounded growth rate was 3.8 percent 
before 1973 and 2.1 percent after that. This slowdown 
does not represent a continuing downward trend, however. 
While the increases in per-capita GDP for these 16 coun-
tries is on average smaller during 1973-89 than during 
1950-73, the average rate of increase is still larger in 
1973-89 than in 1820-70, 1870-1913, or 1913-50. The 
average annual compounded growth rates for these peri-
ods are 0.9 percent, 1.4 percent, and 1.2 percent, respec-
tively. From this perspective, the 1973-89 experiences of 
the 16 Maddison countries do not seem abnormally low. 
• No Absolute Poverty Trap 
Despite the development slowdown, remember, the bot-
tom of the range of the distribution of per-capita GDP 
continued to shift up during the 1960-85 period. Chart 9 
makes the point that for all but one of the 10 poorest 
countries (Zaire), per-capita wealth was higher in 1985 
than in 1960. Therefore, the popular hypothesis that coun-
tries which start out below a minimum level of output will 
fail to grow seems not supported by the facts. [For exam-
ples of this hypothesis, see the work of Costas Azariadis 
and Allan Drazen (1990) and Gary S. Becker, Kevin M. 
Murphy, and Robert Tamura (1990).] During 1960-85, at 
least, the poor grew richer right along with the rich. 
The Countries 
We now turn to a systematic examination of wealth mo-
bility during the 1960-85 period, starting with precisely 
what we mean by mobility. 
• A Definition 
Here mobility is the extent to which individual countries 
experienced changes in relative wealth over time. In ef-
fect, it is the movement of the individual atoms in a dis-
tribution over time. Therefore, even though a distribution 
is stable over time, the individual atoms within the distri-
bution can move a great deal from one period to the next. 
To see why, consider the following first-order autore-
gressive process: 
(2) Xz,+1 = p^ + ^(l-p)-f8^ 
1 Observations in the De Long data are only for 1870,1913, and 1979, so we can-
not determine whether the slowdown is characteristic of these data as well. For the Van 
der Eng data, however, we can compare development over the 1950-73 and 1973-85 
periods, and the evidence of a development slowdown among the Asian countries 
during these periods appears to be dependent on the performance of Japan. Including 
Japan, the average annual rate of change drops from 3.6 percent in the 1950-73 period 
to 3.2 percent in the 1973-85 period. Excluding Japan, the average rate increases over 
the two periods. 
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Chart 7 
The Richest Got Richer 
GDP Per Worker Hour Relative to 1989 U.S. Level 
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Chart 8 
A Widespread Upward Shift 
Average Real GDP Relative to 1985 U.S. Level for Selected Wealth Groups 
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Chart 9 
The Poorest Got Richer Too 
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11 where the Eit+l are independently and identically distribut-
ed over both i and t and are normally distributed with 
mean zero and variance a
2. For a large number of atoms, 
the distribution of Xi is approximately normal, with mean 
]x and variance a
2/(l-p
2),
 and is fairly stable over time. 
[With an infinite number of atoms, the distribution is nor-
mal with mean \x and variance a
2/(l-p
2)
 and is stable over 
time.] That is, if we took a series of snapshots of the den-
sity function of the distribution, one at each point in time, 
all the snapshots would look roughly the same. 
Yet if we were to trace the paths of each individual 
atom X(, we would find that Xit and Xit+l would typically 
not be identical. In fact, the position of Xit and Xit+l could 
differ substantially depending on the value of p in the auto-
regressive process (2). If p were selected to be zero, then 
X would be normally distributed with mean p and vari-
ance a
2. For this specification, the serial correlation be-
tween Xit and Xit+l would be zero and there would be no 
persistence in positions. If p were selected to be 2
1/2, then 
X would be normally distributed with mean p and vari-
ance 2a
2. And then the serial correlation between Xit and 
Xit+y would be positive. Note that if p were set equal to 
-(2
 /2), then the distribution would be the same as when 
it was 2
1/2, yet the paths of two atoms, one in each distri-
bution, that started at the same location, would look very 
different. 
• Rough Symmetry 
Let's look now at the distribution of changes in relative 
wealth over the 1960-85 period. Chart 10 shows this dis-
tribution for the changes expressed as average annual com-
pounded rates. This average rate of change is equal to the 
annual rate of growth of a country's per-capita GDP mea-
sured in current prices less the annual rate of growth of 
U.S. per-capita GDP measured in current prices over the 
1960-85 period. An average annual compounded rate of 
change of zero percent, then, implies no change in relative 
wealth over the 1960-85 period. 
As Chart 10 illustrates, the distribution of relative 
wealth changes over the 1960-85 period is roughly sym-
metric. Over this period, the percentage of countries that 
experienced increases in relative wealth is roughly equal 
to the percentage that experienced decreases. Moreover, 
the percentage of countries with average annual com-
pounded rates greater than 2 percent is roughly equal to 
the percentage with average rates less than that. 
• Miracles and Disasters 
Within this distribution, quite a few countries experienced 
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Chart 10 
The Distribution of Wealth Changes 
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very large increases or decreases in relative wealth— 
experiences we call development miracles and disasters. 
To make the magnitude of these changes more concrete, 
we list in the accompanying table the 10 countries with 
the largest increases in relative wealth and the 10 coun-
tries with the largest decreases in relative wealth over the 
1960-85 period, and we express these changes as factor 
changes. 
Here's how we compute those factor changes. Let yi t 
denote the relative wealth of country i in year t. Then for 
countries that experienced increases in relative wealth, this 
factor increase is just 
(3) 1985^,1960 
and for countries that experienced decreases in relative 
wealth, this factor decrease is just 
(4) ^,1960/V/ ,1985* 
Of the 10 development miracles listed in the table, the 
most spectacular is Saudi Arabia. The next most spectacu-Stephen L. Parente, Edward C. Prescott 
The Wealth of Nations 
Development Miracles and Disasters 
Countries in the 102-Country Data Set With Largest Changes 
in Relative Wealth During 1960-85 (Expressed as Factor Changes) 
Increases  Decreases 
Factor  Factor 
Country  Change  Country  Change 
Saudi Arabia  3.32  Zambia  2.63 
Lesotho  3.19  Mozambique  2.63 
Taiwan  2.60  Madagascar  2.50 
Hong Kong  2.59  Angola  2.38 
South Korea  2.40  Chad  2.13 
Egypt  2.38  Liberia  2.04 
Congo  2.18  Ghana  2.00 
Japan  2.10  Zaire  1.96 
Singapore  2.09  Nicaragua  1.85 
Syria  1.89  Afghanistan  1.75 
Source of basic data: Summers and Heston 1991 
lar is Lesotho (in southeastern Africa), which happens to 
have been the poorest country in the world in 1960. These 
two countries are followed by three southeastern Asian 
countries. 
Of the 10 development disasters during 1960-85, the 
biggest losers were Zambia (in south-central Africa) and 
Mozambique (in southeastern Africa), followed closely by 
Madagascar. Most of the 10 countries that experienced the 
largest decreases in relative wealth experienced military 
conflicts during this period. 
• No Relative Poverty Trap 
The fact that Lesotho experienced such a dramatic increase 
in relative wealth suggests that there is no relative poverty 
trap either. The issue of whether there is a relative poverty 
trap is separate from the issue of whether there is an abso-
lute one. Those countries at the bottom of the distribution 
may have remained trapped there even though the wealth 
distribution shifted up. But during 1960-85 they clearly 
didn't. While several countries that were among the poor-
est in 1960 were still among the poorest in 1985, some 
were not. In 1960, the five poorest countries were Burma, 
Lesotho, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. In 1985, the five 
poorest countries were Ethiopia, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, 
and Zaire. Two of the five poorest countries in 1960, Bur-
ma and Lesotho, were no longer among the poorest in 
1985. Thus, neither an absolute nor a relative poverty trap 
exists. 
• Some Poor Losers 
Still, none of the 10 countries that experienced the largest 
increases in relative wealth over the 1960-85 period could 
be considered rich in 1960 by 1960 U.S. standards. None 
of these countries had a relative wealth in 1960 that ex-
ceeded 0.30, and all but Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan 
had relative wealth less than 0.20. Despite the develop-
ment experience of these countries, we can't say that poor-
er countries systematically outperformed richer countries 
in the 1960-85 period. Indeed, countries with relative 
wealth below the median in 1960 typically experienced 
smaller increases in relative wealth than countries with rel-
ative wealth above the median. 
The fact that the initially poor countries didn't, on aver-
age, experience larger increases than the initially rich is 
highlighted in Chart 11. This chart shows the two distribu-
tions of changes in the relative wealth for the two types of 
countries over the 1960-85 period. The median level of 
Chart 11 
The Rich vs. The Poor 
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13 relative wealth in 1960 was 0.15. Apparently, the distribu-
tion of changes for the countries that started above the me-
dian stochastically dominates the distribution for the coun-
tries that started below the median. True, several initially 
poor countries experienced spectacular development over 
the 1960-85 period, but most of them lost ground to the 
initially rich countries. 
Conclusion 
The changes in the wealth of nations can be characterized 
by the great disparity between rich and poor and the con-
stancy of that disparity over time and within the range of 
the distribution. But these changes can also be character-
ized by the upward shift of the distribution, which has 
meant that nearly all countries became somewhat richer, 
and by the demonstrated ability of some countries to spec-
tacularly change their positions within the wealth distribu-
tion. These are the four development facts, and theories of 
economic development must be able to account for them. 
Any theory that fails to do so simply is not a development 
theory. 
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Appendix 
Countries, Years, and Sources of Our Data Sets 
The Main Data Set 
For 1960-85, From Summers and Heston* 
North and  Europe  Asia  Africa 
Central America  Austria  Afghanistan  Algeria  Senegal 
Canada  Belgium  Bangladesh  Angola  Sierra Leone 
Costa Rica  Denmark  Burma (Myanmar)  Benin  Somalia 
Dominican Republic  Finland  China  Burundi  South Africa 
El Salvador  France  Hong Kong  Cameroon  Sudan 
Guatemala  Germany, West  India  Central African Republic  Tanzania 
Haiti  Greece  Iran  Chad  Togo 
Honduras  Ireland  Iraq  Congo  Tunisia 
Jamaica  Italy  Israel  Egypt  Uganda 
Mexico  Netherlands  Japan  Ethiopia  Zaire 
Nicaragua  Norway  Jordan  Ghana  Zambia 
Panama  Portugal  Korea, South  Guinea  Zimbabwe 
United States  Spain  Malaysia  Ivory Coast 
Sweden  Nepal  Kenya 
South America  Switzerland  Pakistan  Lesotho 
Argentina  Turkey  Philippines  Liberia 
Bolivia  United Kingdom  Saudi Arabia  Madagascar 
Brazil  Yugoslavia  Singapore  Malawi 
Chile  Sri Lanka  Mali 
Columbia  Oceania  Syria  Mauritania 
Ecuador  Australia  Taiwan  Morocco 
Paraguay  New Zealand  Thailand  Mozambique 
Peru  Papua New Guinea  Niger 
Uruguay  Nigeria 
Venezuela  Rwanda 
* Because of missing data, we have excluded from our analysis 18 large countries (those with a population of at least 1 million in 1969) which Summers and Heston include: Bulgaria, Burkina 
Faso, Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Indonesia, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Mongolia, Namibia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and Yemen. 
The Longer Data Set 
For Years Listed, From Three Sources 
Maddison  De Long  Van der Eng 
Australia  Italy  1820 
Austria  Japan  1870 
Belgium  Netherlands  1913 
Canada  Norway  1950 
Denmark  Sweden  1973 
Finland  Switzerland  1989 
France  United Kingdom 
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